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Gerenciamento de resultados em instituições 
financeiras brasileiras
No presente trabalho, tem-se como objetivo estudar o geren-
ciamento de resultados em uma amostra representativa de 123 
bancos no mercado brasileiro entre os anos de 2001 e 2012. 
Dado o papel importante que os bancos desempenham na 
economia de um país, é necessário entender que existem fatores 
discricionários envolvidos no relato de rentabilidade de uma 
instituição financeira. Regras de provisionamento de crédito 
para as instituições financeiras brasileiras estão descritas na 
Resolução 2682/99 do Conselho Monetário Nacional. Por causa 
da discricionariedade permitida nessa resolução, a provisão para 
perdas de crédito é usada como instrumento de gerenciamento 
de resultados, o que não é uma prática ilegal, mas esse compor-
tamento afeta a percepção de risco dos agentes e analistas, e eles 
devem estar cientes disso e compreendê-lo. Os resultados mostram 
que o provisionamento de crédito é usado como um mecanismo 
de gerenciamento de resultados para suavizar o lucro líquido 
das instituições financeiras brasileiras. Os bancos brasileiros 
procuram evitar não somente o lucro líquido antes de despesas 
com provisão e impostos negativos, mas também lucro líquido 
antes de despesas com provisão e impostos inferiores em relação 
ao período anterior. Ao contrário de estudos anteriores, não está 
claro se os bancos procuram evitar lucro líquido inferior a um 
determinado grupo de pares.
Palavras-chave: instituições financeiras brasileiras, gerenciamento 
  de resultado, provisão de crédito, regressão  
 com dados em painel.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several authors who have studied earnings management 
in banking have found empirical support for the claim that 
banks use the loan loss provision for earnings management 
(Anandarajan, Hasan, & Vivas, 2003; El Sood, 2012). The 
authors have also found evidence of earnings management 
when there is a positive relationship between financial 
institutions’ expenditures on loan loss provisions and their 
outcomes. Thus, a better outcome motivates greater spending 
on loan loss provisions to mitigate gains (Ahmed, Takeda, & 
Thomas, 1999; El Sood, 2012; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Yang, 
2005).
There are several goals of earnings management. The 
main objective is typically income smoothing, which is used 
either when the previously established earnings are high, 
thus reducing the reported earnings, or when the earnings are 
considered low, to increase the reported earnings (Zenderski, 
2005). In this context, managers attempt to avoid presenting 
negative net income or a decrease in profit in relation to the 
previous period (Bornemann, Kick, Memmel, & Pfingsten, 
2012). The main objectives of this behavior are to transmit an 
image of solidity and good performance to the market (Goulart, 
2007) and to influence agents’ risk perception (Balboa, López-
-Espinosa, & Rubia, 2013; El Sood, 2012), in addition to other 
personal goals of managers such as maintaining dividends and 
contractual bonuses, which are generally at least partially tied 
to a financial institution’s performance (El Sood, 2012). A 
manager can also choose to continue an earnings management 
position, even if it may compromise the quality of the presented 
accounting figures or if it entails future sacrifices by the 
organization (Martinez, 2001). Financial institutions also seek 
to meet goals where they can be compared with an industry 
benchmark or the performance of a peer group (Bornemann 
et al., 2012).
In Brazil, National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetário 
Nacional – CMN) Resolution 2682/99 established the 
regulatory framework for loan loss provision accounts. The 
expenses associated with a loan loss provision account are 
based on the risk level of the loan portfolio, which is defined 
by specific criteria in relation to the debtor and the guarantees 
involved. Because the regulation only suggests guidelines and 
not objective criteria that determine risk ratings, the Central 
Bank has delegated to financial institutions the freedom to 
define credit models at each institution’s discretion, resulting in 
possible inconsistencies related to loan loss provision accounts.
Bornemann et al. (2012) carried out the following tests in 
the German banking market: (i) assessed whether banks avoid 
a decrease in net income (excluding loan loss provisions) in 
relation to the previous period, thus seeking to achieve lower 
outcome variability; and (ii) assessed whether banks seek to 
avoid a decrease in net income (excluding loan loss provisions) 
in relation to its peer group. Previous studies on the Brazilian 
banking market focused on evaluating whether firms practiced 
earnings management using a provision account. These studies 
tested the hypothesis of a positive relationship between a 
financial institution’s expenses and earnings, which would 
constitute income smoothing (Goulart, 2007; Zenderski, 2005).
The present study aims to investigate earnings management 
in Brazilian banking, and the study’s main contribution is 
an unprecedented examination of the reasons for earnings 
management by Brazilian banks, following the framework 
established in the study by Bornemann et al. (2012). The focus 
of this study is the loan loss provision account management 
because it is a financial institution’s main discretionary 
account. Second, banks have high leverage, which makes them 
vulnerable to volatility in asset prices and requires them to make 
constant adjustments to their loan loss provision accounts to 
maintain adequate coverage of their loan portfolios (Gonzalez, 
2007). Thus, the credit provision account is closely associated 
with the earnings account and has an important effect on a 
bank’s profitability.
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is used; this 
approach is unprecedented for Brazil and was not used by 
Bornemann et al. (2012). Additionally, this study is the first 
in the Brazilian market to employ data from the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009; these data are used as control variables 
in the investigation of the reasons for earnings management 
by Brazilian banks.
The study is extremely important because financial 
statements are the main source of public information on banks, 
and they serve as a tool to determine banks’ current economic 
and financial position, their potential for growth, and future 
trends (Assaf, 2007). Additionally, because banks also have 
systemic importance in a country’s economy, it is essential 
to be able to discern whether and to what extent earnings 
management occurs in the Brazilian banking market.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The regulation that controls the credit provisioning rules in 
Brazil is Resolution 2682 of the Central Bank of Brazil from 
December 21, 1999. As defined by the law, a credit rating must 
be based on some criteria set by the Central Bank and should 
include at least certain criteria defined by the Resolution. 
These criteria are the identified provisions in which there is a 
direct relationship between the credit provision and customers’ 
credit risk.
Although Resolution 2682 results in the evaluation of 
credit risk by financial institutions, the regulation does not 
specify the characteristics for each risk category. Thus, each 
bank is responsible for evaluating each of the elements of the 
Resolution according to its own criteria and must define its 
own proprietary model for risk assessment (Parente, 2000). 
The Resolution introduced a framework for the evaluation of 
credit risk in financial institutions, but it allowed some freedom 
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and room for discretion. The Resolution states that the credit 
provision has a discretionary criterion: “the classification of the 
operation at the corresponding risk level is the responsibility 
of the institution holding the credit”. That is, the loan loss 
provision (LLP) is defined according to the judgment of the 
manager regarding the risk of the granted loans.
Because the Central Bank only establishes the elements 
that should be considered in the rating process, it delegates to 
financial institutions the freedom to define the models at each 
institution’s discretion.
Despite this discretion, financial institutions are often 
subject to supervision by the Central Bank regarding the 
classification of their credit operations. Therefore, they must 
retain documentation demonstrating their established risk 
levels. The classifications defined by each institution must also 
be disclosed in the explanatory notes to the financial statements, 
as well as the amount of renegotiated credit provisions, 
provisions against losses, and recovered amounts.
Discretion is allowed by the legislation for credit ratings 
between the AA and H levels; however, an investigation of 
whether such discretion creates regulatory arbitrage would 
require not only the individual analysis of each grant of 
credit but also comparative research to evaluate each specific 
customer of the different financial institutions. In this study, 
such an analysis is not performed, and this characteristic is 
not used to investigate the existence of earnings management.
The research that is performed in this study concerns 
regulatory arbitrage made possible by unidentified provisions 
or general provisions, which allows an examination of whether 
there is earnings management in Brazilian banks. As defined 
by the International Monetary Fund, general provisions are 
intended to cover possible or potential losses that are not yet 
identified, while specific provisions reflect already-identified 
losses.
Financial institutions have the opportunity to make 
additional provisions beyond the levels provided by Resolution 
2682 by working with a provision allowance in relation to 
delayed credits. Non-identified provisions are those that 
are not associated with loans classified as “in liquidation” 
or as “delayed”. This practice is known as a “provisioning 
buffer” (Parente, 2000). These unidentified provisions may 
create a negative aspect as an auspicious environment arises 
for regulatory arbitrage and a consequent decrease in the 
transparency of financial data, which can cause a loss of 
efficiency in the allocation of resources and potential danger 
to the stability of the financial system. The establishment of 
provisions detached from risk ratings opens up the possibility 
of analyzing credit operations in a less rigorous manner, thereby 
improving customer risk ratings by using less conservative 
criteria. This practice may encourage behavior that constitutes 
a provisioning buffer in the search for comparative advantages 
in relation to a bank’s peers, not through improved efficiency in 
the management of credit risk but through a less conservative 
portfolio evaluation. This lack of transparency can lead to 
efficiency losses because it generates rates that are incompatible 
with the institution’s risk.
No Brazilian author has tested the hypotheses proposed in 
this study and, despite the fact that the credit provision account 
is a financial institution’s main accrual account, few significant 
studies have focused on this account (Goulart, 2007; Zenderski, 
2005). Goulart (2007) found that earnings management using 
the provision account provided more significant results with 
regard to derivatives and securities.
The main subjects of study in Brazil have used the securities 
account (Corrar & Gabriel, 2010; Dantas, Medeiros, Galdi, 
& Costa (2013), 2013; Goulart, 2007; Zenderski, 2005), 
derivatives (Dantas, Galdi, Capelletto, & Medeiros, 2013; 
Galdi & Pereira, 2007; Goulart, 2007), and the practice of 
securitization (Galdi & Camara, 2012). The hypotheses tested 
in this study follow the framework used by Bornemann et 
al. (2012) and seek to investigate whether there is earnings 
management in Brazil and how it is practiced.
However, Bornemann et al. (2012) study used a particularity 
of the German financial system, i.e., the existence of a hidden 
reserve called the “340f Reserve”, which was enacted by 
German law in 1993. The 340f reserve is established by 
devaluing active accounts and, unlike the loan loss provision 
account, its creation does not need to be tied to the inherent 
risk of a certain category of accounts. From the standpoint of 
earnings management, the great advantage of setting up this 
type of reserve is that a justification for it is not required, and 
therefore discretion can be used. In Brazil, the absence of 
similar legislation to the 340f account, along with a lack of 
data, prevents the use of a similar methodology to that used by 
Bornemann et al. (2012) and therefore requires that this study 
adjusts to the Brazilian reality.
The loan loss provision is used in the present study because 
according to Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2010), it is the 
largest accrual for most of the largest banks and thus plays a 
significant role in earnings management.
There are various forms of earnings management, and in this 
study, we focus on the practice of income smoothing, which is 
used to reduce the dispersion of results and convey an image of 
solidity and good performance to the market (Goulart, 2007). 
There are other purposes of earnings management, which are 
not addressed in this article. For example, a) “bump up” which 
improves a bank’s performance when the results are close to 
a given target; b) the “cookie jar”, when there is an incentive 
to reduce earnings for the current period to increase earnings 
in less favorable periods; c) the “big bath”, which is used in 
periods where a bank knows that it will fall short of a certain 
goal and decides to further reduce profitability.
The hypotheses that we investigate in this study are cited as 
the main motivations in the capital market by Goulart (2007). 
He claimed that the intention to satisfy certain benchmark 
results can be cited as a reason to prevent the disclosure of 
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losses, demonstrate rising profits, and meet the expectations 
of investment analysts regarding a firm’s results. Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) argued that there is evidence of the existence 
of a hierarchy: it is most important to prevent the disclosure 
of losses; it is secondarily important to show increasing 
returns; and finally, firms must meet expectations and analysts’ 
forecasts. The authors defined this hierarchy within the capital 
market; however, it can also be applied to financial institutions, 
which are seen by investors as a potential target for investment 
through financing or the purchase of securities.
The existing studies on the Brazilian market have 
investigated the existence of a positive correlation between 
a financial institution’s provision expenses and net income 
(Goulart, 2007; Zenderski, 2005)
The first and most intuitive form of earnings management 
aims to avoid losses (negative profits). By analyzing the 
profitability of a financial institution, analysts or investors 
primarily evaluate whether the net income is positive; this 
analysis does not require historical or comparative data 
(Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999). Such research yields 
a simple and straightforward answer on whether a financial 
institution is profitable. Showing net income below zero is 
avoided in financial statements because from a macroeconomic 
perspective, net losses in a given year raise questions regarding 
a bank’s solidity and arouse more public interest in investigating 
the reasons for the poor performance.
From a microeconomic perspective, shareholders wish 
to increase their influence in a bank’s management after 
the presentation of losses. In both cases, the administrative 
decisions by the bank’s management are now restricted. Thus, 
managers have strong incentives to preserve the confidence 
of shareholders and avoid presenting any losses, or at least to 
present net income higher than zero. A bank that has a narrow 
loss in a period will therefore perform earnings management 
through increased revenue and/or expense reductions to reverse 
the losses and generate profits (Goulart, 2007).
Thus, we define the first hypothesis:
H1: Banks seek to avoid negative net income pre-loan loss 
 provisions and taxes.
Previous studies that investigated loan loss provision 
accounts focused mainly on the positive relationship between 
expense accounts for bad debts and income (before provisions 
and tax expenses). Thus, the central hypothesis addressed by the 
existing literature already described earnings management as 
managers’ incentive to reduce the variability of their reported 
earnings using the flexibility provided by discretionary 
accounts (Anandarajan et al., 2003; El Sood, 2012). Thus, 
within the accounting rules, managers may increase/decrease 
discretionary accruals when a bank reports significant/small 
profits (Balboa et al., 2013). Ahmed et al. (1999) stated that 
when profits are expected to be high, expenses for provisions 
are deliberately minimized to mitigate the adverse effects of 
other factors on profitability. This approach is known as income 
smoothing.
Dantas, Galdi, Capelletto e Medeiros (2013) found evidence 
that banks use the discretionary portion of their derivative 
accounts for income smoothing, which is a more commonly 
used practice in private institutions. However, the author’s 
study did not mainly focus on provision accounts. In another 
study, Dantas, Medeiros, Galdi, & Costa (2013)) also found 
that securitization is used to smooth earnings.
An important benchmark for managers is the ratio of profits 
in period t in relation to period t - 1, and they are inclined to 
avoid a drop in profits from the previous period. Bornemann et 
al. (2012) argued that investors in the German banking market 
interpret perennial increases in net income as the appearance 
of management’s trust in the prospects of future profitability.
In publicly traded banks, share price and bank value tend to 
increase after an increase in dividend payments from periods 
of increased profitability, which strengthens the position of 
managers. Similarly, a drop in profits in comparison to the 
previous period induces investors to seek a more profitable 
alternative. For unlisted banks, the motivation to avoid a 
decrease in profitability results from a desire for a reduction 
in interference from shareholders, regulators, and other 
stakeholders. Goulart (2007) stated that although his research 
on the Brazilian market focused only on income smoothing, 
other earnings management practices are also considered to 
be of interest for financial institutions as actions to prevent the 
disclosure of losses and declining profits. These practices are 
examined in this study.
Bornemann et al. (2012) also stated that managers wish to 
reduce the volatility of the net income of their banks because 
less income variability reduces the cost of capital and reflects 
a lower perceived probability of failure of their financial 
institution.
Thus, we formulate the second hypothesis:
H2: Banks seek to avoid negative net income pre-loan loss 
provisions and taxes in relation to the previous period.
Managers also seek to meet a profitability benchmark of 
banks’ industry or peer group. They tend to avoid a decrease 
in net income compared with this peer group. This hypothesis 
was first tested by Bornemann et al. (2012) in the international 
market and has not yet been tested in the Brazilian market. 
We can draw a parallel between the third hypothesis and 
the third level of the hierarchy suggested by Goulart (2007). 
After achieving the first two levels of the hierarchy suggested 
by Dechow and Skinner (2000), the third goal is to meet the 
projected results of analysts. Here, we test whether banks seek 
to meet an industry benchmark that is considered by most 
analysts and that therefore creates a certain level of expectation 
in the forecasts.
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Bornemann et al. (2012) stated that stakeholders value a 
bank’s performance in relation to a peer group and not only 
in relation to the bank’s past performance. In fact, managers 
themselves analyze a bank’s performance against others in 
the same region and with a similar profile. This comparison 
creates incentives for managers to avoid decreases in profit 
compared with their peer group. Those outside a financial 
institution create a “threshold mindset”, i.e., they create certain 
expectations regarding the bank’s performance (Degeorge et al., 
1999), and these expectations can also refer to the comparative 
performance of banks with similar profiles.
Analysts and investors frequently perform comparative 
financial analyses of financial institutions that have similar 
profiles. With this in mind, managers may seek to match or 
even stand out from their peers. Most analysts consider the 
outcomes of a group of banks with similar profiles, and these 
outcomes and comparisons are also taken into consideration 
by managers (Degeorge et al., 1999).
In general, banks with similar profiles and therefore similar 
risks should ideally have similar financial statements and 
outcomes. Any significant deviation from this pattern calls 
the attention of analysts, who then perform a more detailed 
investigation to understand the reasons for the negative deviation.
Thus, we propose the third hypothesis:
H3: Banks seek to avoid negative net income pre-loan loss 
provisions and taxes in relation to the previous period of 
a given peer group.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data
The data used in this study were extracted from information 
published by the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do 
Brasil – BCB) under different forms: Balance Sheet Accounts 
(Sisbacen data), Financial Information Quarterly (Informações 
Financeiras Trimestrais – IFT), and Outcome Statement 
Accounts from the BCB.
The sample was derived from the consolidated bank data I 
and II, totaling 123 banks, which are all the Brazilian banks with 
annual data for the period between 2001 and 2012. The initial 
period of the study was limited by a lack of data from Financial 
Information Quarterly and the BCB (Outcome Statement 
Accounts) prior to this period. These 123 banks represent a 
significant and a representative portion of the total assets of the 
Brazilian financial system. In December 2012, they had total 
assets of R$ 5.1 trillion, which amounts to approximately 90% 
of all assets in the Brazilian market.
Banks were classified into five different categories 
according to their profiles and their main business segments: 
Retail Banks, Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks, Public Banks, 
Automaker Banks (connected to a non-financial company 
active in the automobile/truck market), and Cooperative 
Banks. These categories were used for the investigation of 
Hypothesis 3.
Table 1 provides detailed information on the number of 
banks observed in the sample with the classifications into 
the different segments. The amount of data at the end of the 
analysis period is greater because the database was constructed 
retroactively, i.e., we selected banks in 2012, and data from 
previous years was extracted from the respective CNPJ 
(Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica – VAT identification 
number) of each bank.
The sample data form an unbalanced panel because certain 
financial institutions did not exist in a given year or they had 
no available balance information; therefore, the number of 
observations is not the same for each year.
There is a predominance of retail banks in the sample 
and the cooperative banks and public banks categories have 
considerably small samples; however, these categories were 
retained in the sample due to the unique role that they both 
play in the economy.
Table 2 shows the number of banks that hold loan loss 
provision reserves above the minimum required by the Central 
Bank and how their use varies over time. Only the banks with 
available information about loan loss provision reserves were 
used in the Table 2. It can be seen that banks increasingly 
use discretion in the provision of credit operations, i.e., 
they increasingly retain a reserve supply of credit above the 
regulatory required minimum. In 2001, 28.7% of the sample 
banks retained provisions in excess of the regulatory minimum, 
and in 2012, this percentage increased to 54.1%.
3.2. Variables
As Brazil does not have the similar German financial 
legislation to the 340f account, we adapted our study to 
the loan loss provision. To analyze the practice of earnings 
management using loan loss provisions, we use the percentage 
of expense with credit provisions in the period (llp) as the 
dependent variable, which is the total spent on credit provision 
for year t as a percentage of total assets. All variables that 
use balance sheet data were normalized by the total assets for 
the period. Following the method suggested by Brown et al. 
(2009), this procedure was used to avoid the problem of scale 
effect. Other authors followed a similar methodology (Balboa 
et al., 2013; Bornemann et al., 2012; Shrieves & Dahl, 2003). 
In addition, we also adjusted our explanatory variables by 
including loan loss provision’s discussion of Anandarajan, 
Hasan and Vivas (2005), Fonseca and González (2008), and 
El Sood (2012).
Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are tested using the following 
dummy variables:
•	 d_loss: the value 1 represents the situation where a bank has 
net income before provisions below zero, representing H1. 
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Table 2
Number of Banks and Percentage With Only Minimal Provision and With Excess of Provision Loan Loss 
Reserves by Year from 2001 to 2012
Period
Only Minimal Provision Excess Provision Total
No. % No. % No. Row %
2001 62 71.3 25 28.7 87 7.3
2002 58 63.7 33 36.3 91 7.6
2003 60 65.2 32 34.8 92 7.7
2004 61 64.2 34 35.8 95 7.9
2005 55 58.8 39 41.5 94 7.9
2006 54 54.5 45 45.5 99 8.3
2007 56 56.6 43 43.4 99 8.3
2008 50 49.0 52 51.0 102 8.5
2009 49 45.4 59 54.6 108 9.0
2010 49 45.8 58 54.2 107 8.9
2011 49 44.1 62 55.9 111 9.3
2012 51 45.9 60 54.1 111 9.3
654 54.7 542 45.3 1,196 100.0
We assume that banks will reduce % expense with credit 
provision if they have negative net income. As 1 represents 
negative net income, the negative sign is expected.
•	 d_prev_year: the value 1 represents the situation where a 
bank shows a decrease in net income before the LLP that is 
lower than the previous year, representing H2. We assume 
that banks will reduce % expense with credit provision if 
banks expect net income lower than the previous year. As 1 
represents net income below the previous year, the negative 
sign is expected.
Table 1
Number of Banks in the Sample and Percentage by Different Segments and by Year from 2001 to 2012
Period
Cooperatives Automaker Public Subsidiaries Retail Total
No. Row % No. Row % No. Row % No. Row % No. Row % No. Row %
2001 2 1.9 13 12.0 9 8.3 29 26.9 55 50.9 108 7.9
2002 2 1.8 13 11.9 9 8.3 30 27.5 55 50.5 109 7.9
2003 2 1.9 13 12.0 9 8.3 29 26.9 55 50.9 108 7.9
2004 2 1.9 13 12.0 9 8.3 29 26.9 55 50.9 108 7.9
2005 2 1.8 14 12.7 9 8.2 29 26.4 56 50.9 110 8.0
2006 2 1.8 14 12.5 9 8.0 31 27.7 56 50.0 112 8.2
2007 2 1.8 14 12.3 9 7.9 31 27.2 58 50.9 114 8.3
2008 2 1.7 15 12.8 9 7.7 33 28.2 58 49.6 117 8.5
2009 2 1.7 16 13.4 9 7.6 35 29.4 57 47.9 119 8.7
2010 2 1.6 17 13.8 9 7.3 36 29.3 59 48.0 123 9.0
2011 2 1.6 17 13.9 9 7.4 36 29.5 58 47.5 122 8.9
2012 2 1.6 17 13.8 9 7.3 36 29.3 59 48.0 123 9.0
24 1.7 176 12.8 108 7.9 384 28.0 681 49.6 1,373 100.0
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•	 d_peer: the value 1 represents the situation where a bank 
shows a decrease in net income before provisions in relation 
to its peer group, representing H3. We assume that banks 
will reduce % expense with credit provision if banks expect 
net income lower than their peer in the previous year. As 1 
represents net income below the net income in the previous 
period of respective peer group, the negative sign is expected.
Analysts and investors frequently perform comparative 
financial analyses between financial institutions that have the 
same activity profiles. Knowing this, managers seek to match 
or even stand out from their peers. Ideally, banks with similar 
activity profiles and therefore similar risks should generally 
have similar results. Any significant deviation from this pattern 
negatively calls the attention of analysts.
The outsiders of a financial institution create a “threshold 
mindset”, i.e., they create certain expectations regarding a 
bank’s performance (Degeorge et al., 1999); therefore, it was 
expected that H3 showed significant results. In the Brazilian 
market, banks with similar profiles tend to show similar results 
for profitability.
To investigate the three hypotheses, we use the following 
control variables (a summary of all the variables is shown in 
Table 3):
•	 ni_assets: the main control variable in this study is the 
accounting net income excluding credit provisions and 
taxes in the period. In the analysis of the balance sheet of 
a company, it is expected that the higher net income, lower 
spending, if revenue remains constant, in other words, 
there must be a negative relationship between earnings and 
expenditure. However, as previously stated, several scientific 
studies have found evidence of earnings management in 
financial institutions, and in this case, the authors found a 
positive relationship between earnings and expenditure on 
credit provision, indicating that companies increase their 
expenditure on credit provision when they have higher 
profits, in order to mitigate their earnings.
•	 organizational	structure	characteristics:	publicly	traded	
bank	(dummy	variable).	The literature showed conflicting 
perspectives on the impact a publicly traded bank would 
have on earnings management (Fonseca & González, 
2008). On the one hand, a publicly traded bank has a greater 
incentive to manage earnings. Because these banks have 
more outsiders, the publication of their financial statements 
may have greater signaling effects. Anandarajan et al. (2005) 
stated that a publicly traded bank has incentives to manage 
earnings because such banks are examined in detail by 
their stakeholders, board members, and potential investors. 
The authors expected a positive relationship. However, the 
opposite can also be argued. Smaller banks, which normally 
are not publicly traded, often have fewer opportunities for 
diversification. Thus, these banks have incentives to seek 
greater profitability through more risky activities, which 
would encourage these banks to deliver results that cover up 
these risky activities. Fonseca and González (2008) stated 
that regulators focus on supervision of the larger banks 
because the larger banks have greater systemic importance 
and are consequently at the center of any banking crisis. 
Balboa et al. (2013) raised a question about the reputational 
issue because when managers perform earnings management, 
others can monitor their behavior, which results in the 
repression of this behavior.
•	 service	earnings	in	relation	to	total	assets. Higher service 
earnings may indicate that a bank depends less on traditional 
credit activities. According to Anandarajan et al. (2005), it 
would therefore be plausible that these banks are more active 
in allocating the appropriate credit reserves to present the 
image of being a “safer” institution. The reverse can also 
be argued, in the sense that banks with higher revenue from 
services may practice more aggressive banking activities. 
These banks may then have higher credit risk and compensate 
for this increased risk through higher expenditures on 
provisions to manage an uncertain future. The author stated 
that it is not possible to predict the sign (positive or negative) 
of this relationship.
•	 provisions	 in	 excess	 (dummy	 variable). Based on 
Resolution 2682 discussed above, Brazilian banks must have 
a minimum level of provisions they must hold according 
to the risk profile of their loan portfolios (the risk profile 
is determined by the credit rating categories AA to H). The 
Resolution determines the minimum provisions, and each 
bank has the discretion to hold provisions above what is 
defined in the regulation if it deems it necessary. This variable 
takes a value of one if the bank holds provisions above the 
minimum requirement, meaning that there is a discretionary 
portion associated with the provision account.
•	 amount	 of	 the	 provisions	 in	 excess. If a bank holds 
provisions above the minimum required by Resolution 2682, 
this variable determines the amount of the excess provisions 
in relation to total assets.
•	 GDP	growth. Some behaviors of managers can be explained 
by factors in a bank’s economic environment. The GDP 
growth variable is a natural indicator of the aggregate business 
cycle and captures the general conditions of the economy; 
thus, it is an external indicator of credit risk (Balboa et al., 
2013). It is expected that the cyclical component of expenses 
on provisions is negatively correlated with this variable. 
The Risk Management Theory emphasizes the interests of 
supervisors in reducing the cyclical nature of capital and 
provision expenses. Following the subjective criteria of 
Resolution 2682 discussed above, banks define a protection 
level against expected losses (through the definition of 
their optimal coverage level) and increase their capital in 
accordance with the non-expected loss. In other words, loan 
loss reserves are established in periods of economic growth, 
and losses – and therefore the use of these reserves – occur 
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in periods of recession. Thus, the establishment of a credit 
reserve has a cyclical nature (El Sood, 2012; Fonseca & 
González, 2008).
•	 unemployment. The unemployment variable was used by 
Anandarajan et al. (2003) as an indicator of economic activity. 
An increase in unemployment could mean an economic 
depression that can increase the credit risk of banks, forcing 
the banks to increase expenditures on provisions.
•	 financial	crisis. The years of the financial crisis are used as a 
control variable. To define which years are considered crisis 
years, we use the criterion suggested by El Sood (2012), 
which considers 2007-2009 as the years of crisis. There may 
be a change in the provisioning behavior of banks during 
periods of financial instability.
The use of the years 2001-2012 as control variables to 
control the time effect in the tested model was considered 
and evaluated. However, because there are few observations 
in some years, the use of these variables was discarded. See 
Table 3.
3.3. Econometric model
Because “detailed regulations on building 340f reserves 
are lacking [...]” stated Bornemann et al. (2012, p. 2410), “[...] 
banks can use this account at their own discretion”. Thus, data 
on the 340f account have the great advantage of not requiring a 
distinction between the discretionary and the non-discretionary 
portions. In the present study, this distinction is necessary 
because we use the loan loss provision account as a dependent 
variable. Zenderski (2005) also made this distinction and 
identified the discretionary and non-discretionary components 
of expenditures on loan loss provisions.
As discussed in Section 2, the loan loss provision account 
has discretionary and non- discretionary components. 
McNichols (2000) highlighted the importance of properly 
isolating these two components in studies on earnings 
management. Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) used a two-stage 
approach where the first stage aimed to identify the normal, 
or non-discretionary, estimators of the provision expenditure 
account. In the first equation, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) used 
the variables “beginning loan loss allowance”, “write-offs”, 
“change in total loans outstanding”, “total loans outstanding”, 
“non-performing loans” and “loan categories”. The residuals 
from the first regression were the abnormal, or discretionary, 
component of the provision. In the second stage, the authors 
tested the relationship between the residuals of the first 
regression and the object of study.
Deboskey and Jiang (2012) used a similar methodology. In 
the first equation, he sought to identify the non-discretionary 
portion using control variables that captured various attributes 
of the financial institution’s loan portfolio and that may have 
explained the variation in the loan loss provision account. In the 
second step, the residuals of the first regression were used as 
the discretionary component of the loan loss provision account. 
Zenderski (2005) also followed this methodology of isolating 
the discretionary and the non-discretionary components of the 
provision accounts.
According to Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2003), a 
two-stage estimation is inconvenient because it underestimates 
the absolute value of the regression coefficients of the 
second stage. Additionally, to increase the reliability of the 
empirical results, Zenderski (2005) found that the use of 
one-stage estimations showed the same results as two-stage 
regressions. Likewise, El Sood (2012) used a one-stage 
regression, isolating the discretionary component of the loan 
loss provision through variable control elements that were 
considered non-discretionary. The author used three control 
variables as indicators of the non-discretionary component of 
the provision accounts.
In the present study, we have the great advantage of having 
a database with the credit balances classified by the categories 
AA – H and, from the rules found in Resolution 2682, it 
is possible to calculate the minimum mandatory provision 
for each financial institution. The difference between the 
effective provision and the minimum required provision is the 
discretionary provision made by the bank. So we can use a 
one-stage regression to solve the problem.
The investigation of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 is 
performed using the equation [1]. The sample for this study 
combines annual observations from various banks over a period 
of time (2001-2012); therefore, to test hypotheses H1 to H3, 
we use panel data methodology, which combines time series 
and cross-sectional observations.
 llpit = β0 + β1in _assetst + β2pubtrad _dummyt +  
 β3serv _assetst + β4GDPt + β5unemplt + β6prov  
 _excess _dunnyt + β7excess _provt + β8d _losst  
[1] 
 + β9d _prev _yeart + β10d _peert + c1 + dt + εt
where ci is the financial institution unobserved effect, dt is the 
time unobserved effect, and εit is the idiosyncratic error.
The variables that use balance data were normalized by 
the total assets for the period. This procedure was adopted 
following the methodology suggested by Brown et al. (2009) 
to avoid the problem of scale effect. Other authors followed a 
similar methodology (Balboa et al., 2013; Bornemann et al., 
2012; Shrieves & Dahl, 2003).
We use a one-stage model to determine the discretionary 
portion of the loan loss provision account. This process aims to 
isolate the discretionary component of the loan loss provision 
through control variables of elements that are considered non-
-discretionary. The control variables included in the model for 
this purpose are d_prov_excess and excess_prov. We have 
the great advantage of having balance data for Brazil that 
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Table 3
Summary of Variables Used in the Model, Expected Sign, the Definitions and the References  
that Used These Variables
Variable Expected Sign Definition References
% expense with credit 
provisions/total assets [llp]
--- Expense with credit provisions in the period Anandarajan et al. (2005)
Bornemann et al. (2012)
El Sood (2012)
Fonseca and González (2008)
% expense with credit 
provisions/total assets of 
previous period [llp(-1)]
(+) Expense with credit provisions in the previous 
period
Bornemann et al. (2012)
% net income/total assets 
[ni_assets]
(+) Accounting net income in the period Anandarajan et al. (2005)
Bornemann et al. (2012)
El Sood (2012)
Fonseca and González (2008)
1= publicly traded [d_pubtrad] (+) or (-) May have different incentives for earnings 
management in publicly traded banks
Anandarajan et al. (2005)
Balboa et al. (2013)
Fonseca and Gonzales (2008)
% Services income/total assets 
[serv_assets]
(?) Indicates the dependence of the bank in 
relation to credit activities
Anandarajan et al. (2005)
1= bank has provisions in 
excess regarding the regulatory 
minimum [d_prov_excess]
(+) Indicates banks that use discretion in credit 
provisioning
Resolução 2682,  
December 21, 1999
% Value of the provisions excess/
total assets [excess_prov]
(?) Provision excess regarding the  required 
regulatory minimum
Resolução 2682,  
December 21, 1999
% GDP growth [GDP] (-) Macroeconomic environment factors influence 
the behavior of the bank
Balboa et al. (2013)
El Sood (2012)
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008)
% Unemployment [unempl] (+) Macroeconomic environment factors influence 
the behavior of the bank
Anandarajan et al. (2003) 
Bornemann et al.  (2012)
1= years of crisis (2007-2009) 
[d_crisis]
(?) Aims to investigate behavior changes in 
periods of crisis
El Sood (2012)
1= net income below zero in the 
period [d_loss (H1)]
(-) H1: Investigates if banks seek to avoid net 
income below zero. 
Bornemann et al. (2012)
1= net income below the net 
income in the previous period 
[d_prev_year (H2)]
(-) H2: Investigates if banks seek to avoid 
decreases in net income in relation to the 
previous period
Bornemann et al. (2012)
1= net income below the net 
income in the previous period 
of the respective peer group 
[d_peer (H3)]
(-) H3: Investigates if banks seek to avoid 
decreases in the net income with credit 
provisions and taxes in relation to the 
previous period of a determined peer group
Bornemann et al. (2012)
Note: Net income refer to “net income excluding credit provisions and taxes”.
allow us to identify the portion of the provision stock that is 
discretionary, or unidentified. These control variables aim to 
identify the discretionary portion of the provision expenditure 
account.
To examine hypotheses H1 to H3, we fit the panel data 
regression by two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to control 
for the potential endogeneity between the variables used in the 
model that originate from the same year balance sheet data. One 
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concern in estimating the existence of earnings management 
in banks is the possible endogeneity existing between loan 
loss provision (llp) and the other control variables originating 
from the balance sheet or the earnings statement (ni_assets, 
serv_assets, and excess_prov). This could occur because the 
dependent variable and some of the independent variables use 
balance sheet data from the same fiscal year, there is these 
variables are simultaneously determined.
The idea of the 2SLS estimation method is to use a set 
of variables, called instruments that should be correlated 
with the endogenous variables and that are not correlated to 
the error term. Studying earnings management, Fonseca and 
González (2008) expressed concern about endogeneity when 
using instruments based on lagged explanatory variables. 
Then we use as instruments the lagged variables for all 
endogenous explanatory variables from the balance sheet. 
These instrumental variables have a direct effect on the 
endogenous explanatory variable, it is partially correlated 
with the endogenous variable, and it has no direct effect on 
the dependent variable. See Greene (2010) and Wooldridge 
(2002) for details.
4. RESULTS
Figure 1 presents the annual average percentual expense 
with credit provisions. It may be noted that Brazilian financial 
institutions have spent on average between 1.5% and 2.0% with 
credit provision, with little variation over time. The descriptive 
analysis of the numeric variables in the period is presented in 
Table 4. Although the majority of financial institutions present 
little bit spent on credit provision, there is a high dispersion, 
with some institutions that spend just over 30% with credit 
provision. This same pattern can be observed for net income 
and services income.
Table 5 presents the statistical description of the categorical 
variables and the average expense with credit provisions 
by categories. Descriptively, we can verify that financial 
institutions which showed negative net income in the previous 
period had lower spending on credit provision on average, 
compared to those with a positive net income (1.34% versus 
1.80%, respectively), which is in line with the hypothesis 1 
(H1). The descriptive analysis also confirms the hypothesis 
2 (H2), since financial institutions with lower net profit than 
the previous period also had lower average spending on credit 
provision, compared to the others (1.42% versus 2.04%). It 
is also noticed that financial institutions with net profit lower 
than the previous net income of its peer group had a slightly 
higher spending on credit provision in relation to the other 
(1.84% versus 1.70%), contradicting the hypothesis 3 (H3). It 
is still possible to see that publicly traded financial institutions 
have less spending on credit provision than others, and those 
financial institutions with provision in excess in relation to 
Figure 1: Annual Average % Expense With Credit Provisions (LLP)
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Table 4
Descriptive Analysis of the Numerical Variables in the Period (Sample Size, Mean, Standard Deviation, 
Minimum and Maximum)
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
llp 1213 1.80 2.91 0.00 31.99
ni_assets 1361 4.00 6.25 -87.30 40.53
serv_assets 1263 2.97 6.81 0.00 74.80
GDP 1375 11.75 3.13 6.26 16.38
unempl 1500 7.83 2.18 4.60 10.90
excess_prov 1196 0.17 0.45 0.00 5.38
Notes: llp: % expense with credit provisions/total assets 
 ni_assets: % net income/total assets 
 serv_assets: % services income/ total assets 
 GDP: % GDP growth 
 unempl: % Unemployment 
 excess_prov: % provisions excess/total assets 
Table 5
Statistical Description of the Categorical Variables and Average % Expense With Credit Provisions by 
Categories (Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values)
Variable Category n (%)
% Expense With Credit Provisions
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d_pubtrad 0 1031 (85.07) 1.83 3.07 0.00 31.99
1 181 (14.93) 1.56 1.76 0.21 16.63
d_prov_excess 0 638 (54.86) 1.68 2.96 0.00 31.99
1 525 (45.14) 2.03 2.95 0.00 22.05
d_crisis 0 899 (74.17) 1.79 2.99 0.00 31.99
1 313 (25.83) 1.72 2.67 0.00 19.56
d_loss 0 1090 (89.93) 1.72 2.90 0.00 31.99
1 122 (10.07) 1.34 3.03 0.00 16.63
d_prev_year 0 707 (63.18) 2.04 3.02 0.00 22.05
1 412 (36.82) 1.42 2.79 0.00 31.99
d_peer 0 219 (19.57) 1.70 2.41 0.00 15.75
1 900 (80.43) 1.84 3.07 0.00 31.99
Notes: d_pubtrad: 1= publicly traded 
 d_prov_excess: 1= bank has provisions in excess regarding the regulatory minimum 
 d_crisis: 1= years of crisis (2007-2009) 
 d_loss: 1= net income below zero in the period 
 d_prev_year: 1= net income below the net income in the previous period 
 d_peer: 1= net income below the net income in the previous period of the respective peer group
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minimum regulatory spend more on average than the others. 
The period of crisis did not change the average spending on 
credit provision of Brazilian financial institutions.
We checked the correlations between the explanatory 
variables in the model to indicate the level of multicollinearity. 
Using the criteria in Gujarati (2006), we conclude that no 
correlation was large enough to cause problems because none 
of them is higher than 0.8 in module. The highest correlation 
value was between the percentage of expense with credit 
provisions and the percentage of net income (0.46) and 
there was a moderate correlation between GDP growth and 
unemployment (0.45).
For the analysis of the hypotheses H1 to H3, we estimate 
five regression models that are used to predict the existence or 
non-existence of earnings management in Brazilian financial 
institutions at the period of 2001 to 2012, see Table 6. The 
Model 1 is the baseline model that contains only the control 
variables; Models 2, 3 and 4 test separately the hypotheses H1, 
H2 and H3, respectively; while Model 5 is used to compare 
the hypotheses among themselves. The five estimated models 
had similar results for sign and for statistical significance of 
the variables, so we focus our analysis on the description of 
the full model (Model 5).
First, there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the expense with credit provisions and the 
net income. This result corresponds to the expected sign and 
characterizes the practice of income smoothing by Brazilian 
financial institutions at the period. There is a strong dependence 
on the spent provision today compared to the previous period, 
indicating the persistence of this type of expenditure. In 
other words, each financial institution has a standard for such 
spending, and those that spend more tend to always spend more, 
while those that spend less tend to always spend less, as if there 
was an inertia in corporate balance sheets.
We found strong evidences that banks seek to avoid negative 
net income pre-loan loss provisions and taxes (H1). As we code 
1 for negative net income and 0 for positive and zero income, 
the coefficient has the expected sign (-), meaning that net 
income excluding loan loss provisions and taxes is positively 
correlated with loan loss provision expenditures. The higher/
lower the profit, the higher/lower the incentive for management 
to increase/decrease the expenditures on provisions to reduce/
increase the net income in the period.
The results show that there is a strong positive association 
between d_loss and llp, and the p-value of d_loss is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result means that managers 
seek to avoid a decrease in profits in relation to the previous 
period. In this case, considering those banks with negative net 
incomes spent approximately 0.9 percentage points (pp) less 
with credit provision than those banks with positive and null 
net incomes, ceteris paribus.
This result is in line with that of Degeorge et al. (1999), 
who also found evidence that banks use thresholds to show 
positive net income. In Brazil, this result is expected because the 
primary metric used for profitability analysis is the evaluation 
of net income above zero.
We also found evidence that banks avoid negative net 
income pre-loan loss provisions and taxes in relation to the 
previous period (H2). The p-value of coefficient of d_prev_
years is significantly negative at 1% level. As d_prev_years = 
1 represents net income below the previous year (d_prev_years 
= 0 represents net income above or equal the previous year), 
negative coefficient shows that banks with net income below 
the net income in the previous period spent approximately 0.42 
pp less with credit provision than those banks with net income 
above or equal net incomes of previous periods, ceteris paribus.
This result shows that banks seek income smoothing and 
avoid showing net income below their net income in the 
previous period. “Net income excluding loan loss provisions 
and taxes” below the “net income excluding loan loss provisions 
and taxes” of the previous period is positively correlated with 
“expenses for loan loss provisions”.
Analysts estimate not only the profits during a period but 
also the evolution of the profitability of a financial institution. 
Thus, it is expected that a bank always seeks to obtain increasing 
profits so it does not show a deceleration in profitability, which 
could attract attention to the institution’s financial situation.
Finally, we could not find support evidence that banks seek 
to avoid negative net income pre-loan loss provisions and taxes 
in relation to the previous period of a given peer group (H3). 
The p-value of d_peer is not statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This result shows that there is no evidence that managers 
seek to meet a profitability benchmark of the industry or its peer 
group of banks. It is not clear if they tend to avoid a decrease 
in net income compared with this peer group.
The joint analysis of the hypotheses using Equation [i] 
shows that H1 has a coefficient that is nearly four times higher 
than H2 and eleven times higher than H3. This result shows 
that the main objective of managers in relation to earnings 
management is to avoid showing negative net income. The 
second objective is to avoid showing decreases in net income 
compared with the previous period, and, finally, the third 
objective sought by managers is to prevent decreases in net 
income compared with a peer group.
This “hierarchy” of the goals sought by management is 
justifiable in the sense that the net income in the period is the 
primary metric for the profitability of a financial institution. 
Showing negative net income requires explanations to analysts 
and investors and, depending on the magnitude, can affect a 
bank’s capitalization, thus calling the attention of regulators. 
This hierarchy is aligned with that presented by Degeorge et 
al. (1999) and had not yet been tested in Brazil.
Showing a decrease in net income from the previous period 
does not necessarily mean that a bank reported a loss. A bank 
may show a decrease in profitability but still have positive net 
income. This situation most likely requires explanation, but it 
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Table 6
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for the Regression Model With Panel Data 
Using 2SLS and Random Effects
Explanatory Variable
Dependent Variable: % Expense With Credit Provisions/Total Assets
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
llp (-1)  0.5931***  0.5127***  0.5891***  0.5924***  0.5640***
(0.0681) (0.0375) (0.0283) (0.0292) (0.0311)
ni_assets  0.1030***  0.1456***  0.1097***  0.1026***  0.1377***
(0.0359) (0.0385) (0.0237) (0.0255) (0.0287)
d_pubtrad -0.2475** -0.1286 -0.2866 -0.2213 -0.1689**
(0.1044) (0.2197) (0.1800) (0.1815) (0.1827)
serv_assets -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0045
(0.0043) (0.0141) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118)
GDP -0.0872*** -0.0827*** -0.0826*** -0.0877*** -0.0789***
(0.0175) (0.0224) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0213)
Unempl  0.0244  0.0168  0.0125  0.0278  0.0099
(0.0325) (0.0383) (0.0347) (0.0356) (0.0347)
d_prov_excess  0.2673*  0.3023  0.2414  0.2850*  0.2858*
(0.1533) (0.1908) (0.1602) (0.1620) (0.1593)
excess_prov -0.1107 -0.0410 -0.0666 -0.1102 -0.0793
(0.2395) (0.3078) (0.2435) (0.2460) (0.2406)
d_crisis -0.1287 -0.1278 -0.1340 -0.1298 -0.1339
(0.2342) (0.1474) (0.1408) (0.1411) (0.1391)
d_loss (H1) --- -0.8974** --- --- -1.0252***
--- (0.4097) --- --- (0.3174)
d_prev_year (H2) --- --- -0.3256** --- -0.4198***
--- --- (0.1546) --- (0.1503)
d_peer (H3) --- --- ---  0.1430  0.1626
--- --- --- (0.1616) (0.1617)
Constant  1.1872***  1.0621***  1.3331***  1.0454***  1.0235***
(0.2538) (0.3309) (0.3079) (0.3410) (0.3415)
R2 overall 0.5109 0.5203 0.5158  0.5111  0.5271
Adjusted R2 0.5064 0.5090 0.5108  0.5061  0.5211
Notes: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
 llp_1: % expense with credit provisions/total assets of previous period
 ni_assets: % net income/total assets
 d_pubtrad: 1= publicly traded
 serv_assets: % services income/ total assets
 GDP: % GDP growth
 unempl: % Unemployment
 d_prov_excess: 1= bank has provisions in excess regarding the regulatory minimum
 excess_prov: % provisions excess/total assets
 d_crisis: 1= years of crisis (2007-2009)
 d_loss: 1= net income below zero in the period
 d_prev_year: 1= net income below the net income in the previous period
 d_peer: 1= net income below the net income in the previous period of the respective peer group
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may have less relevance. However, it is virtually mandatory for 
analysts to perform a historical trend analysis of the profitability 
of a financial institution.
The most significant control variable in all of the tested 
equations is GDP growth, which shows the importance of the 
economic cycle in a bank’s credit provisioning.
5. CONCLUSION
The present study aims to study earnings management in 
a significant sample of banks in the Brazilian market between 
2001 and 2012. Given the important role that banks play in a 
country’s economy, it is important to understand that there are 
discretionary factors involved in the reporting of a financial 
institution’s profitability. Because managers utilize accounting 
criteria established in regulations, earnings management is not 
an illegal practice. However, this behavior does affect the risk 
perception of agents and analysts, and they should be aware 
of it and understand it.
Authors abroad have used the methods that we apply to the 
Brazilian market, and we find similar results. Bornemann et al. 
(2012) confirmed the practice of earnings management using 
a particularity of the German system that cannot be applied to 
Brazil. The authors found that German banks avoid showing 
negative net income, avoid showing decreases in profits relative 
to the previous period, and avoid showing decreases in profits in 
relation to their peer group’s previous period. The reserve in the 
German system is used in a discretionary manner by the banks. 
Bornemann et al. (2012) did not use a two-stage regression 
(2SLS), but we still find similar results. Likewise, our results 
are similar to those of Degeorge et al. (1999), who carried out 
a study of the hierarchy of earnings management practices that 
resulted from focusing on publicly traded companies. We note 
that the results found by Degeorge et al. (1999) also apply to 
financial institutions because they are evaluated closely by both 
regulators and investors.
The results from this study show that Brazilian banks 
perform earnings management. Two out three of the tested 
hypotheses show statistically significant results. They are: (i) 
Banks seek to avoid negative net income pre-loan loss provisions 
and taxes; (ii) Banks seek to avoid negative net income pre-loan 
loss provisions and taxes in relation to the previous period. 
Contrary to the previous studies, it is not clear if banks seek to 
avoid negative net income pre-loan loss provisions and taxes in 
relation to the previous period of a given peer group.
This study’s had main contribution is its identification of 
a hierarchy of earnings management practices that had not 
yet been tested in Brazil. We also use a model with two-stage 
panel data (2SLS) for the first time in this context. We are able 
to prove the existence of a management mechanism with an 
instrumental variable, which proves that earnings management 
is practiced through loan loss provision accounts. This result 
also proves that managers use gradual adjustments that may 
be reflected in subsequent periods.
So far, there has been little media attention on the practice 
of earnings management in banks, and interest has remained 
restricted to the academic world and analysts. In this context, 
the aim of this study is to create greater transparency regarding 
the information that is disclosed on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions. Analysts are frequently faced with credit 
ratings that do not reflect a client’s actual risk because imprecise 
information is provided about financial institutions’ real risk. 
Other earnings management practices are also common, such 
as presenting higher net annual balance sheets using loans that 
last for only one day. Awareness of these financial imperfections 
is important to properly assess a financial institution’s risk 
from the perspective of a regulator, an analyst, or an investor.
As an extension of this research, we suggest that future 
examinations of this subject use one specific analysis of 
earnings management in Brazilian banks during the crisis 
period. We also suggest investigating the behavior of different 
segments of banks in relation to earnings management.
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Earning management in Brazilian financial institutions
The present study aims to study earnings management in a significant sample of 123 banks in the Brazilian market 
between 2001 and 2012. Given the important role that banks play in a country’s economy, it is important to understand 
that there are discretionary factors involved in the reporting of a financial institution’s profitability. Credit provisioning 
guidelines for Brazilian financial institutions are described in Resolution 2682/99 of the National Monetary Council 
(Conselho Monetário Nacional). Because of the discretion allowed in this resolution, loan loss provision is used as 
instrument of earnings management, which is not an illegal practice, but this behavior does affect the risk perception 
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of agents and analysts, and they should be aware of it and understand it. We found that credit provisioning is used 
as an earnings management mechanism to smooth the net income of Brazilian financial institutions. Brazilian banks 
tend to avoid not only negative net income pre-loan loss provisions and taxes, but also negative net income pre-loan 
loss provisions and taxes in relation to the previous period. Contrary to the previous studies, it is not clear if banks 
avoid lower net income pre-loan loss provisions and taxes than a given peer group.
Keywords: Brazilian financial institutions, earning management, loan loss provision, panel data regression.
Gestión de resultados en instituciones financieras en Brasil
El objetivo en este trabajo es estudiar la gestión de resultados en una muestra representativa de 123 bancos en el 
mercado brasileño, entre 2001 y 2012. Teniendo en cuenta el importante papel que desempeñan los bancos en la 
economía de un país, es necesario entender que hay factores discrecionales implicados en la información sobre 
la rentabilidad de una institución financiera. Normas de asignación de crédito para las instituciones financieras 
brasileñas se describen en la Resolución 2682/99 del Consejo Monetario Nacional. Debido a la discrecionalidad 
permitida en la resolución, la provisión para pérdidas de crédito se utiliza como herramienta de gestión de resultados, 
lo que no es una práctica ilegal, sin embargo, este comportamiento afecta a la percepción de riesgo de los agentes y 
analistas, que deben ser conscientes de eso  y entenderlo. Los resultados muestran que la asignación de crédito se 
utiliza como un mecanismo de gestión de resultados para suavizar el beneficio neto de las instituciones financieras 
brasileñas. Los bancos tratan de evitar no sólo el beneficio neto antes de gastos con provisión e impuestos negativo, 
sino también el beneficio neto antes de gastos con provisión e impuestos inferior en relación con el período anterior. 
A diferencia de lo que indican estudios anteriores, no está claro si los bancos buscan evitar el beneficio neto inferior 
a un determinado grupo de pares.
Palabras clave: instituciones financieras brasileñas, gestión de resultados, asignación de crédito,  
  regresión con datos de panel.
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